Motivated by the application of designing fair and efficient school choice lotteries, we consider constrained efficiency notions for random assignments under priorities. We provide a constrained (priority respecting) version of the ordinal efficiency welfare theorem for random assignments. Moreover, we show that a constrained version of a cardinal second welfare theorem fails to hold. JEL-classification: C78, D47
Introduction
The assignment of students to schools (Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez, 2003 ) is one of the major applications of matching theory. A school choice mechanism assigns students to schools taking into account the preferences of students and priorities of the students at the different schools. Thick priorities are a generic problem in school choice. In practice, students are prioritized according to very coarse criteria (based e.g. on proximity, or having a sibling in the school) such that many students have the same priority for a seat at a school. Thus, one can sometimes not avoid to treat students differently ex-post even though they have the same priorities and preferences. However, ex-ante, some form of fairness can be restored by the use of lotteries. This has motivated researchers to study the problem of designing fair school choice lotteries.
A minimal ex-ante fairness requirement for random assignments under priorities is that the lottery should respect the priorities. One way of formalizing this requirement is the following: A student i has ex-ante justified envy if there is a school s where * The author thanks Péter Biró, Battal Doǧan, Bettina Klaus, Flip Klijn, Jordi Massó, Panos Protopapas, Marek Pycia and participants of the Sixth World Congress of the Game Theory Society for interesting discussions and comments on a previous version of the paper. The author is particularly grateful to Antonio Miralles for pointing out the connection of the results to the ordinal welfare theorems of McLennan and of Manea. Financial support by the Swiss National Science Foundation (SNSF) under project 100018-150086 is gratefully acknowledged. a lower priority student j has a positive probability of receiving a seat and i would rather have a seat in s than at some other school at which he has a positive probability of receiving a seat. In this case, it would be natural to eliminate the justified envy, i.e. changing the probability shares such that i has a higher chance of receiving a seat at school s at the expense of the lower ranked student j. Ex-ante stability requires that there is no ex-ante justified envy.
Respecting priorities, usually leads to efficiency losses (Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez, 2003) . Naturally, this motivates the question under which conditions efficiency can be reached in a constrained, i.e. priority respecting, way. Our paper contributes to this discussion. We formulate new notions of constrained efficiency properties for random allocations. The notions are motivated by the observation that there can be two sources of efficiency losses in the context of allocating under thick priorities. The first source is the direct effect of choosing higher or lower admission thresholds at the different schools: Already in the context of deterministic assignments with strict priorities, there can be multiple priority respecting assignments that are distinguished by which priority ranks are sufficient to be admitted at a school. By reallocating seat from higher to lower priority applicants, one obtains a priority-respecting assignment that is better from the point of view of applicants. The second source of efficiency loss is a pure mis-allocation effect that can only happen if priority classes are thick. In this case, it can happen that a priority-respecting assignment can be made more efficient just be reallocating (probabilities of obtaining) seats among equal priority applicants without admitting more lower priority student at any school. We focus on the second kind of efficiency losses and call an assignment constrained efficient if is not dominated (in efficiency terms) by a random assignment that does not use a "more lenient" admission policy at any school. Formulating constrained efficiency in this way, lets us clearly distinguish between the effect of harder or softer admission policies and the welfare gains through reallocating school seats within priority classes.
Our main result is a constrained ordinal efficiency welfare theorem for priority respecting lotteries under our constrained efficiency notion. We also consider cardinal welfare theorems (for the difference between cardinal and ordinal welfare theorems see the discussion below) and show by means of a counter example that a cardinal second welfare cannot be established for our constrained efficiency notion in the context of the pseudo markets of He et al. (2017) .
Related Literature
The literature on priority respecting lotteries has been motivated by the application of designing school choice mechanisms. In the school choice set-up, ex-ante stability has been introduced by Kesten andÜnver (2015) . For the classical marriage model the condition was first considered by Roth et al. (1993) . Kesten andÜnver (2015) consider mechanisms that implement ex-ante stable assignments and satisfy constrained ordinal efficiency properties. He et al. (2017) define an appealing class of mechanisms that implement ex-ante stable lotteries. These mechanisms generalize the pseudo-market mechanisms of Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979) by allowing for priority-specific pricing (agents with different priorities are offered different prices).
Welfare theorems have been studied in the context of random assignments without priorities. It is important here, to distinguish between ordinal efficiency welfare theorems and cardinal welfare theorems. An ordinal efficiency welfare theorem establishes that ordinal efficiency (in the sense of first order stochastic dominance) for a random assignment is equivalent to the existence of a cardinal utility profile consistent with the ordinal preferences under which the random assignment is Pareto efficient when lotteries are evaluated according to expected utility. Pareto efficiency can be strengthened to social welfare efficiency. The original ordinal welfare is due to McLennan (2002) . A constructive proof was later provided by Manea (2008) . In this paper we generalize the ordinal efficiency welfare theorem to the case of random assignments with priorities.
Cardinal welfare theorems for random assignments are counterparts to the classical welfare theorems for exchange economies. For cardinal welfare theorems, utility profiles are the primitive of the model. In this context, a classical mechanism due to Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979) uses a pseudo market in probability shares to randomly allocate objects. Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979) show that the equilibria of their pseudo markets are Pareto efficient and hence establish a cardinal first welfare theorem. In a recent contribution, Miralles and Pycia (2014) establish a cardinal second welfare theorem that demonstrates that each Pareto efficient random allocation can be decentralized as a pseudo-market equilibrium by appropriately choosing budgets and prices. The main technical difficulty in their proof, in comparison to the classical welfare theorems for exchange economies, is that in the context of lotteries one necessarily deals with satiated preferences (since probabilities have to add up to 1, respectively since each applicants receives at most one school seat). We show that the result does not generalize to the markets with priority-specific pricing of He et al. (2017) .
Model and Preliminary Results

Model
There is a set of n agents N and a set of m schools M . A generic agent is denoted by i and a generic school by j. In each school j, there is a finite number of seats q j ∈ N. We assume that there are as many school seats as agents, j∈M q j = n. 1 A lottery over schools is a probability distribution over M .
Agents have preferences over lotteries over schools. Preferences of agents can be modeled in two different ways: In the first version, each agent i has strict preferences P i over different schools. We call P = (P i ) i∈N a preference profile. We write j R i j if j P i j or j = j . The preferences can be extended to a partial preference order over lotteries using the stochastic dominance criterion: A lottery π first-order stochastically dominates lottery π with respect to preferences P i , if for each j ∈ M we have
Our results can be generalized to the case where the number of school seats and agents differ by adding dummy agents and schools. See Aziz and Klaus (2017) , for the details of this construction. and the inequality is strict for at least one school j. We write π P SD i π if π first order stochastically dominates π according to P i and π R SD i π if either π P SD i π or π = π . In the second version, each agent i has a von-Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) utility vector U i = (u ij ) j∈M ∈ R M + . We call U = (U i ) i∈N a utility profile. We assume that utilities are strict, i.e. for j = j we have u ij = u ij . Lotteries are evaluated according to expected utility. Thus agent i prefers lottery π to lottery π if
A utility vector contains more information than a preference relation. In addition to ranking the schools, the vNM-utilities express the rates with which agents substitute probabilities of obtaining seats at the different school. Utility vector U i is consistent with preferences P i , if for each pair of schools j, j ∈ M we have jP i j ⇔ u ij > u ij . Each utility vector U i is consistent with one preference relation P i that we call the preference relation induced by U i . It is a standard result (see e.g. Proposition 6.D.1 in Mas-Colell et al., 1995) , that if lottery π first order stochastically dominates lottery π according to preferences P i , then lottery π yields higher expected utility than π according to any vNM-utilities U i consistent with P i .
Each school j has a weak (reflexive, complete and transitive) priority order j of the agents. We let i ∼ j i if and only if i j i and i j i. We let i j i if and only if i j i but not i j i. The priorities j of a school j partition N in equivalence classes of equal priority agents, i.e. in equivalence classes with respect to ∼ j . We call these equivalence classes priority classes and denote them by N 1 j , N 2 j . . . , N j j with indices increasing with priority. Thus for a > b, i ∈ N a j and i ∈ N b j we have i j i . We use the notation i j N k j to indicate that i has higher priority at j than the agents in the priority class N k j .
2.2 Allocations, ex-ante stability, cut-offs and admission policies A deterministic assignment is a mapping µ : N → M such that for each j ∈ M we have |µ −1 (j)| = q j . A random assignment is a probability distribution over deterministic assignments. By the Birkhoff-von Neumann Theorem, each random assignment corresponds to a bi-stochastic matrix and, vice versa, each such matrix corresponds to a random assignment (see Kojima and Manea (2010) for a proof in the set-up that we consider). Thus each random assignment is represented by a matrix
where x ij is the probability that agent i is matched to an object of type j. We write
The vector x i is a lottery over M . A random assignment represented by the matrix (x ij ) is ex-ante blocked for preference profile P and priorities by agent i and school j if there is some agent i = i with x i j > 0 and i j i and some school j with x ij > 0 and j P i j . In this case we say that i has justified envy at school j. A random assignment is ex-ante stable or ex-ante priority-respecting if it is not blocked by any agent-school pair. 2 The definition extends to the case where agents have VNM-utilities, by considering the preference profile induced by the utility profile. We define the cut-off C j (x) for a school j under assignment x to be the lowest priority class containing an agent that has a positive probability of obtaining a set in school j in x. Formally
Ex-ante stable assignments can be interpreted as lotteries that ration seats in the cutoffs: An agent is assigned with positive probability to (some) of the schools for which is in the cut-off, with the remaining probability allocated to his most preferred school for which he is above the cut-off. This school can be interpreted as the agent's "safe school" where he gets a seat if he does not get a more-preferred seat in one of the school where he is in the cut-off. A school may have different cut-offs in different exante stable lotteries or it may use the same cut-offs but admit a smaller fraction of agents in the cut-off. We say that school j uses a strictly more lenient admission policy under assignment y than under assignment x, if either the school has a strictly lower cut-off in y than in x or it has the same cut-off, but admits a bigger fraction of the students in the cut-off class. Formally
Example 1. Consider five agents, five schools, each with a single seat (q j = 1 for each j), and the following preferences and priorities. The underlined entries in the priority table correspond to the cut-offs under the following two assignments (rows correspond to agents, columns to schools; schools j 1 , . . . , j 4 have the same cut-off under both assignments, school j 5 has a higher cut-off under y than under x): Going through all potential blocking pairs, one can check that both x and y are ex-ante stable. We compare x and y in terms of admission policies. School j 1 uses the same admission policy in assignments x and y as i∈C j 1 (x)
School j 2 uses a more lenient admission policy in x than in y, since the cut-off at j 2 is the same in both assignments, but j 2 admits a bigger fraction of the students in the cut-off class i∈C j 2 (x)
School j 3 uses the same admission policy in assignments x and y as i∈C j 3 (x)
School j 4 uses a more lenient admission policy in x than in y, since the cut-off at j 4 is the same in both assignments, but j 4 admits a bigger fraction of the students in the cut-off class i∈C j 4 (x)
School j 5 uses a more lenient admission policy in x than in y, since the cut-off at j 5 under x is lower in x than y.
Constrained Efficiency
The notion of a more lenient admission policy allows us to define constrained efficiency notions by requiring that an allocation is un-dominated among allocations that do not use a more lenient admission policy at any school. We define three different notions of constrained efficiency based on three different and well-known dominance relations. The first notion is defined for ordinal preferences. A lottery y first order stochastically dominates (SD-dominates) x if for each i ∈ N we have y i R SD i x i and for at least one agent we have y i P SD i x i . Lottery x is constrained ordinally efficient if for each lottery y that SD-dominates x there is a school that uses a more lenient admission policy under y than under x.
The other two efficiency notions are defined for cardinal preferences. A lottery y Pareto dominates lottery x with respect to VNM utility profile U if for each i ∈ N we have
and the inequality is strict for at least one agent. A lottery x is constrained Pareto efficient with respect to U if for each lottery y that Pareto-dominates x with respect to U there is a school that uses a more lenient admission policy under y than under x.
A lottery y dominates lottery x in social welfare terms with respect to VNM utility profile U if
A lottery x is constrained social welfare efficient if for each lottery y that dominates x in social welfare terms with respect to U there is a school that uses a more lenient admission policy under y than under x.
The efficiency notions have been introduced in increasing order of strength. The following proposition summarizes this fact. The proof is easy and follows along wellknown arguments. Proposition 1. Let U be a VNM-utility profile, P the ordinal preference profile induced by U , let be a priority profile and x a random assignment.
1. If x is constrained social welfare efficient with respect to U and , then it is constrained Pareto efficient with respect to U and .
2. If x is constrained Pareto efficient with respect to U and , then x is constrained ordinally efficient with respect to P and .
Proof. For the first part, suppose for the sake of contradiction that x is constrained social welfare efficient but Pareto dominated by a lottery y that does not use a more lenient admission policy at any school. By the definition of Pareto dominance, we have
where the inequality is strict for at least one agent. Summing up the inequalities for different agents we obtain:
But this contradict the assumption that x is social welfare maximizing among lotteries that do not use a more lenient admission policy at any school than lottery x. For the second part, suppose for the sake of contradiction that x is constrained Pareto efficient but first order stochastically dominated by a lottery y that does not use a more lenient admission policy at any school. As noted in Section 2, if for i we have y i P SD i x i then, as U i is consistent with P i j∈M u ij · y ij > j∈M u ij · x ij . Thus if y first order stochastically dominates x, for each i ∈ N we have
where the inequality is strict for at least one agent. But this contradict the assumption that x is Pareto optimal among lotteries that do not use a more lenient admission policy at any school than lottery x.
Constrained ordinal efficiency and strong stable improvement cycles
If a priority-respecting random assignment is not constrained ordinally efficiency, then one can generate a more efficient and priority-respecting random assignment by reallocating probability shares between agents of equal priority or by reallocating probability shares from higher to lower priority agents. It turns out that it is sufficient to look at the reallocation of probability shares within priority classes. Moreover, it is sufficient to look at efficiency improvements through pairwise trade within priority classes. This leads us to the notion of a strong stable improvement cycle that we will introduce next. We will later prove that the absence of these kind of cycles is equivalent to constrained ordinal efficiency. A strong (ex-ante) stable improvement cycle for an ex-ante stable assignment x is a sequence of agents i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i k and schools j 1 , j 2 , . . . , j k such that for each 1 ≤ ≤ k (taking indices modulo k) the following holds:
3. Agents i and i −1 have the same priority at j . 3
Strong stable improvement cycles can be used to increase ex-ante efficiency without violating ex-ante stability, by reallocating probability shares through pairwise trade within priority classes. This can be achieved by transferring probability shares in j 1 from i 2 to i 1 , probability shares in j 2 from i 3 to i 2 , and so on. Changing probability shares in this way will not change the shares of school seats allocated to the different indifference classes. It only reallocates shares within priority classes. Each ex-ante stable random assignment can be transformed into a constrained ordinally efficient exante stable random assignment, by successively reallocating probability shares along a strong stable improvement cycles, until no such cycle is left.
Example 2. Consider a market with two agents and two schools with one seat each. Both agents have the same priority at both schools and agent rank the schools in opposite order:
Consider the assignment:
3 Usually a weaker notion of a stable improvement cycle is considered that has originally been defined for deterministic stable matchings (Erdil and Ergin, 2008) and generalized to the probabilistic set-up by Kesten andÜnver (2015) . In comparison to a strong stable improvement cycles, in the definition of a (weak) stable improvement cycle the third item in the definition is replaced by the weaker condition that i is one of the highest priority agents at school j +1 that prefers j + to some of the object types that he is matched to under Π. Strong improvement cycles are the most obvious sources for an ex-ante, stability-preserving efficiency gain, in the sense that their resolution only reallocates probability shares within priority classes, whereas other stable improvement cycles might redistribute probability shares across priority classes.
Since both agents have the same priority at both schools, the assignment is ex-ante stable. The assignment has however a strong stable improvement cycle consisting of agents 1 and 2 and schools 1 and 2. Reallocating probability shares for school 1 from 1 to 2 and reallocating probability shares for school 2 from 2 to 1, would lead to an efficiency gain.
A consequence of the absence of strong stable improvement cycles is that it allows us to order schools in a way that reflects a common component of the agents' preferences. The following lemma describes the ordering and will be crucial in much of the following discussion.
Lemma 2. Let x be an ex-ante stable random assignment with respect to P and . If x has no strong stable improvement cycle with respect to P and , then there is an ordering of the schools such that the following holds: If i ∈ C j (x) ∩ C j (x) and
Proof. The lemma is a consequence of the combinatorial result that directed graphs are acyclic if and only if they can be topologically ordered. This means that vertices can be ordered such that if there is an arc from vertex v to u then u comes before v in the ordering. 4 To apply this result to our context, we construct a directed graph G(x) on the vertex set consisting of all schools V (G(x)) = M and draw a directed edge from j to j if and only if there is an agent i with x ij > 0 who prefers j to j, i.e. j P i j.
The absence of a strong stable improvement cycle then implies that the graph G(x) is acyclic. Thus we can topologically order the graph G(x). The ordering is the desired ordering of schools (see Figure 1 for an illustration).
Results
Pseudo-Market Mechanisms
In this section, we consider the pseudo-markets with priority-specific pricing of He et al. (2017) . A random assignment is generated by a pseudo-market of probability shares. Each agent has a budget of tokens and can "buy" probability shares at the different object types. Agents face different prices depending on their priority. More precisely, for each object type there is a cut-off priority class. 5 All agents ranked below the cut-off of an object type cannot buy shares at the object type, i.e. they face an infinite price, all agents in the cut-off class face the same finite price and all agents ranked above the cut-off class can get shares at the object type for free. By construction, the mechanisms always implement an ex-ante stable random assignment. Moreover a first welfare theorem holds and pseudo-market equilibrium assignments are constrained Pareto efficient (Theorem 5 in He et al., 2017) . The graph on the right represents the preference information as follows: An arc is drawn from the column corresponding to school j to the column corresponding to school j in the row corresponding to agent i if i is in the cut-off for both j and j , if x ij > 0 and i prefers j to j. For example, agent i 3 is in the cut-off for schools j 1 and j 2 and is assigned with positive probability to j 2 . Moreover, agent i 2 prefers j 1 to j 2 . Therefore we draw an arc from j 2 to j 1 . Arcs implied by transitivity are not represented in the picture. A topological of the schools is j 1 j 4 j 2 j 5 j 3 . Another such ordering is j 1 j 2 j 4 j 5 j 3 .
Formally, a pseudo-market of He et al. (2017) is a triple (U, b, ) consisting of a VNM-utility profile U , priorities and a vector of budgets b ∈ R M + . A constrained equilibrium for the pseudo market (U, b, ) is a triple (x, C, p) consisting of a random assignment x, priority classes according to for the different schools C = (C j ) j∈M called the priority cut-offs, and cut-off prices p = (p j ) j∈M ∈ R M + such that the following holds: Defining for each i ∈ N a price vector p i = (p ij ) j∈M ∈ R M + where
for each i ∈ N the random assignment x is an optimum for the problem
order stochastically dominates the other assignment with respect to school priorities.
Equivalently we can formulate the maximization problem as follows:
It can be shown (He et al., 2017 ) that for each market (U, b, ) there exists a constrained equilibrium. We denote the set of constrained equilibria for (U, b, ) by E(U, b, ). By construction, each equilibrium assignment is an ex-ante stable random assignment.
Proposition 3 (He et al., 2017) . For each utility profile, budget vector and priorities , each constrained equilibrium assignment is ex-ante stable with respect to the induced preference profile.
Proof. Let (x, C, p) ∈ E(U, b, ). Suppose x is ex-ante blocked by i and j. Then i j C j and therefore p ij = 0. Moreover, there is a j with j P i j and x ij > 0. Thus i would obtain a higher expected utility by obtaining shares in j which i can get for free rather than shares in j . We have a contradiction.
We show that constrained equilibrium assignments are constrained Pareto efficient. The argument is very similar to the standard argument that establishes the first welfare theorem in exchange economies. The proposition is a reformulation of a theorem by He et al. (2017) with our constrained efficiency notion.
Proposition 4 (Constrained First Welfare Theorem, He et al., 2017) . For each utility profile U , budget vector b and priorities , each constrained equilibrium allocation is constrained Pareto efficient with respect to U and .
Proof. Let (x, C, p) ∈ E(U, b, ). Suppose y Pareto dominates x and does not use a more lenient admission policy than x at any school. By the definition of Pareto dominance, for each i ∈ N ,
where the inequality is strict for at least one agent. For an agent i, for which the inequality is strict, we have by revealed preferences
Next we show that for an agent i, for which equality holds, i.e.
Suppose for the sake of contradiction that
Since j∈M u ij ·y ij = j∈M u ij ·x ij , lottery y j is a solution to the utility maximization problem. Letj be the most preferred school with a finite price for agent i, i.e.
We show that y i is a degenerate lottery that choosesj for sure, y ij = 1. Indeed, suppose not. Then there is a school j =j with y ij > 0. Since j:i∈C j p j · y ij < b i and u ij > u ij (utilities are strict), increasing probability shares inj by a small positive amount and proportionally decreasing probability shares in j would lead to another feasible lottery π with j∈M u ij · π j > j∈M u ij · y ij and j:i∈C j p j · π j ≤ b i contradicting the observation that y i is a solution to the utility maximization problem. Thus y i is the degenerate lottery that chooses the best school with finite price for agent i. But if this lottery is affordable for i, then it is the unique solution to the utility maximization problem. Thus x i = y i . But this contradicts the assumption that
We have established that for i ∈ N we have j:i∈C j
with strict inequality for at least one agent. Summing the inequalities over all agents, we obtain i∈N j:i∈C j
Rearranging the terms we obtain
This implies that there is an object type j such that p j > 0 and
Since agents below the cut-off C j face infinite prices, we have C j (x) j C j . Since y is not more lenient than x at j, we have C j (y) j C j (x) j C j . Since i∈C j y ij > 0, we have in fact equality: C j (y) = C j (x) = C j . But then, as i∈C j y ij > i∈C j x ij , j uses a more lenient admission policy at y than at x, a contradiction.
It is a natural question whether the constrained efficiency notion in Proposition 4 can be further strengthened. It particular, it seems to be natural to require only that the constrained equilibrium assignment is un-dominated by any random assignment that uses the same cut-offs but does not necessarily assign the same probability mass to each cut-off. Formally, call an assignment x strongly constrained efficient if for each y that Pareto-dominates x there is a school j such that C j (x) j C j (y). The following example shows that constrained equilibrium assignments in general fail to satisfy strong constrained efficiency:
Example 3. Consider four agents, four schools, each with a single seat (q j = 1 for each j), and the following utilities and priorities.
and budgets
The underlined entries in the priorities are cut-offs C such that with prices and we have C j (y) = C j (x) for each j ∈ M.
The Constrained Ordinal Efficiency Welfare Theorem
In this section, we prove the main theorem of our paper.
Theorem 5 (Constrained Ordinal Efficiency Welfare Theorem). Let x be ex-ante stable according to P and . The following statements are equivalent:
1. x has no strong stable improvement cycle with respect to P and , 2. x is constrained ordinally efficient with respect to P and , 3. there exists a VNM-utility profile U consistent with P such that x is constrained Pareto-efficient with respect to U and , 4. there exists a VNM-utility profile U consistent with P , such that x is constrained social welfare maximizing with respect to U and ,
5
. there exists a VNM-utility profile U consistent with P , a budget vector b, prices p and cut-offs C such that (x, C, p) ∈ E(U, b, ).
The utility profile U can be chosen in the same way in (3), (4) and (5).
Proof. Let x be ex-ante stable. By Propositions 1, we have that (4) ⇒ (3) ⇒ (2). It follows immediately from the definitions that (2) ⇒ (1). By Proposition 4, we have (5) ⇒ (3). We will show that (1) ⇒ (4) and (1) ⇒ (5) which will complete the proof.
After the proof, we present an example that will illustrate the proof. The reader may want to consult the example, as a running example during the proof. Suppose x is constrained ordinally efficient. First we define the utility profile U that will be the same in the proof that (1) ⇒ (4) and in the proof that (1) ⇒ (5). By Lemma 2, there is an ordering of the schools such that if an agent prefers a school j for which he is in the cut-off under x to another school j for which he is in the cut-off and x ij > 0 and j j, then i prefers j to j. We choose positive numbers (u j ) j∈M such that for each j, j ∈ M we have
We will define utilities in such way that for each school j all agents in the cut-off of j under x that are matched to j with positive probability have the same utility u j for j. Moreover, this utility will be the maximal utility that any agent who is in the cut-off for j has for receiving a seat in j. Thus we require for each i and j that
Furthermore we choose a numberū > 0 withū < u j for each j ∈ M and require for each agent i ∈ N that for schools for which he is strictly above the cut-off should yield him a utility of at mostū, with utility of exactlyū if x ij > 0. Thus we require for each i and j that i.e.
We show that we can construct U consistent with P such that Conditions (2)- (5) hold. For each agent i ∈ N we distinguish between four types of schools: The set M 1 consists of schools for which i is above the cut-off, the set M 2 of schools for which he is in the cut-off and receives a seat with positive probability under x i , the set M 3 consists of schools for which i is in the cut-off but does not receive a seat under x i , and the set M 4 consists of schools for which he is below the cut-off. We first choose utilities for the first three types of schools. Afterwards, for schools in M 4 utilities can be chosen such that U i is consistent with P i but otherwise arbitrarily.
If M 1 = ∅ we consider the unique school j = max P i M 1 and let u ij =ū. For the other schools in M 1 we choose u ij ≤ū and consistent with P i | M 1 but otherwise arbitrarily. Note that, by ex-ante stability of x, if there is a j ∈ M 1 with x ij > 0, then j = max P i M 1 . Thus Conditions (4) and (5) hold. For j ∈ M 2 , we let u ij = u j . Note that, by ex-ante stability of x, i prefers all schools in M 2 to all schools in M 1 and that by Lemma 2 for j, j ∈ M 2 with j P i j we have u j > u j . Thus the choice of utilities is consistent with P i | M 1 ∪M 2 . Moreover, by construction, Condition (2) holds. Finally for schools in M 3 we have to choose u ij ≤ u j and consistent with P i | M 1 ∪M 2 ∪M 3 to obtain Condition (3). This is possible by Lemma 2: If i prefers j ∈ M 2 to some of the schools in M 1 , then choosing u ij = u j is consistent with P i | M 1 ∪M 2 ∪M 3 by Lemma 2 and u ij ≤ u j holds with equality. If i prefers each school in M 1 to school j ∈ M 2 , then we can choose any u ij < min j u j ≤ u j that makes U i consistent with
Now that we have defined U , we can show that x is constrained social welfare efficient with respect to U and . Suppose for the sake of contradiction that there is a random assignment y that does not use a more lenient admission policy than x at any school and such that j∈M i∈N
First we rearrange the right-hand side of the inequality. Note that by the definition of a cut-off we have j∈M i∈N
By Condition (2) we have
By Condition (4) we have
In conclusion, we have i∈N j∈M
Next we derive an upper for the left-hand side of Inequality (6) as follows: Since y does not use a more lenient admission policy than x at any school, we have:
By Condition (3) we have
By Condition (5) we have
In conclusion, we have j∈M i∈N
Combining this inequality with Inequality (6) and Equality (7), we obtain the inequality
Since u j −ū > 0 for each j ∈ M , there exists in particular a j ∈ M with i∈C j (x)
But this implies that j has a more lenient admission policy under y than x, a contradiction. This concludes the proof that (1) ⇒ (5).
Next we show (1) ⇒ (4). We have to define prices p, cut-offs C and budgets b such that (x, C, p) ∈ E(U, b, ). We define the cut-off classes to be the cut-offs under x, i.e. for each j ∈ M we let C j := C j (x). For each j ∈ M we let
Defining prices in this way guarantees that the relative prices between two schools that an agent obtains with positive probability equals the marginal rate of substitution of the two schools where utility is measured in excess of the utility of the "fall-back school":
We define budgets b = (b i ) i∈N by
We show that for each i ∈ N assignment x i is optimal given prices, cut-offs and his budget, i.e. we want to show that x i is an optimum for the problem:
The dual problem is
The choice of λ = 1 and µ =ū is feasible for the dual, since, by Conditions (2) and (3), for each j with i ∈ C j we have
and since, by Conditions (4) and (5), for each j with i j C j we havē
Now by Conditions (2) and (4) we have
By linear programming duality, this shows that x i is an optimal solution to the agent's maximization problem (and (λ = 1, µ =ū) is optimal for the dual).
Example 1 (cont.). We reconsider the previous Example 1 with the same preferences and priorities as before. Consider the assignment x. One can check that the x is constrained ordinally efficient with respect to P and . To construct a utility profile U such that x is constrained social welfare efficient with respect to U and , we proceed as follows: We can order the schools j 1 j 4 j 2 j 5 j 3 (see Figure 1 ). We let u 1 = 6 > u 4 = 5 > u 2 = 4 > u 5 = 3 > u 3 = 2 >ū = 1.
For agent 1, school 5 is the most preferred school for which he is above the cut-off. He prefers schools 1 and 4 to school 5 and is in the cut-off for both of them and receives both of them with positive probability under x. Thus we let u 11 = u 1 = 6 > u 14 = u 4 = 5 > u 15 =ū = 1.
The other utilities may be chosen consistent with P 1 but otherwise arbitrarily, e.g.
Following the same construction for the other agents, we obtain: We choose the cut-offs of x as cut-offs to decentralize the assignment.
C 1 = C 1 (x) = {1, 2, 3}, C 2 = C 2 (x) = {2, 3, 4}, C 3 = C 3 (x) = {1, 3, 5}, C 4 = C 4 (x) = {1, 2}, C 5 = C 5 (x) = {4, 5}
We choose prices such that for each school j we have p j = u j −ū. Thus By linear programming duality this demonstrates that x 1 is optimal for agent 1.
The Impossibility of a Cardinal Second Welfare Theorem
In our ordinal efficiency welfare theorem we started with ordinal preferences and constructed vNM-utilities, budgets, cut-offs and prices to decentralize an ex-ante stable and constrained ordinally efficient assignment. It it a natural question, whether the result can be strengthened in the following way: Start with a profile of vNM-utilities and show that each constrained Pareto efficient assignment can be decentralized as a price equilibrium. In this final section, we demonstrate by means of a counter-example that this is not possible and a cardinal second welfare theorem does not hold under our constrained efficiency notion. Since the validity of the first welfare theorem (Proposition 4) seems to be very dependent on the particular constrained efficiency notion that we employ (compare Example 3), this is a strong indication that the first and second welfare theorem cannot be obtained jointly for the same constrained efficiency notion.
Example 4. Consider four agents, four schools, each with a single seat (q j = 1 for each j), and the following utilities and priorities. 
